[reprise85]

Originally Posted by Run To Me

i deeply care about the topic of self-deception, more pls

you asked for it

Self-deception is somewhat of a philosophical and psychological puzzle. How can one simultaneously deceive and be deceived? Does this ability necessitate that humans have split minds, with some parts of the mind knowing things that other parts do not know? Further, how could deceiving oneself as to the truth be evolutionarily beneficial (Hippel & Trivers (2011); Trivers, 2000; Van Leeuwen 2007)?
Trivers (2000) and von Hippel & Trivers (2011) argue that there are indeed parts of the mind that are conscious to differing degrees, such as explicit and implicit memory systems, explicit and implicit attitudes, and automatic vs. controlled processes. They offer several possible evolutionarily based explanations for the existence of self-deception, the primary one being that an unknowing liar cannot betray that he or she is lying to someone else because he or she will not exhibit common tells to deception such as sweaty palms and changes in voice quality. Additionally, an unknowing liar would not have any negative emotionality about lying, such as might come up if one were doing so intentionally. That is, self-deception exists so that we can deceive others more easily and engage in acts we would normally feel bad about without experiencing cognitive dissonance (the uncomfortable feeling evoked when one holds two conflicting feelings or beliefs) (von Hippel & Trivers, 2011; Trivers, 2000).
Second, Trivers (2000) asserts that we, as social and moral beings, have a need to see ourselves as benevolent servants to others, and create narratives of our lives that help us believe this to be true. He adopts Freudian defense mechanisms such as denial and projection to explain how we engage in self-deception. In this regard, self-deception allows us to specifically deny the intention of doing something wrong when accused of or otherwise faced with the fact that we have gone against these narratives, such as when caught lying, stealing, or otherwise defecting against somebody else. If a person can truthfully claim ignorance of intent to harm somebody else despite the objective truth that his or her behavior has done so, he or she may lessen both the cognitive dissonance felt and the punishment incurred when confronted with this fact, largely preserving the façade of intentional benevolence to themselves and others (Trivers, 2000).
Finally, von Hippel & Trivers (2011) assert that it may be evolutionarily adaptive to have an overly positive view of the self and the future. Indeed, people do tend to have an overly positive view of themselves (Trivers, 2000). Gilovich (1991) reported that, from a survey of one million high school seniors, 70% thought they had above average leadership ability, with 25% endorsing that they were in the top 1%. In a second survey, 94% of college professors endorsed the belief that they were better at their jobs than average (Gilovich, 1991; Mele, 1997). In a separate study, 75 women and 86 men read an article alleging that caffeine was a danger to women in particular and was associated with breast cancer, and that it should be avoided completely. Subjects then reported how much they believed the article. Unsurprisingly, women who drank more caffeine were more skeptical about the article, while those who drank little caffeine were more likely to be believers (Mele, 1997). The men who were exposed to the article did not differ as much on their belief based on how much caffeine they consumed. Presumably, since the (fake) data did not pertain to them, they were less likely to be biased based on their caffeine consumption (Mele, 1997).
Trivers (2000) also acknowledges that overly positive views of the self and external conditions can also be maladaptive, but considers these situations uncommon. For example, disasters such as plane crashes, spacecraft failures, and poor choices during wars are often facilitated by self-deception. In plane crashes like the crash of Air Florida Flight 90 in 1982, the co-pilot noticed contradictory readings on equipment, but the pilot offered rationalizations for these readings, and the doomed flight took off and subsequently crashed (Trivers, 2000). In another example, NASA knew the Challenger shuttle had defects in essential structures called O-rings and that conditions on launch day were colder than ideal, but the launch went forward despite many members of the ground team (including all 12 O-rings engineers) voting against it. Trivers considered these disasters to be “two-party” and “organizational” self-deception (Trivers, 2000).
Not everyone agrees with the assertion that self-deception is adaptive because it helps us better deceive others. Van Leeuwen (2007) argues that self-deception is not a selected-for adaptation but a byproduct of many other cognitive adaptations, each with their own manifestations of self-deception. First, he believes the manifestations of self-deception are too numerous to be the result of one adaptive module. Second, he points to the obvious fact that self-deception can occur without lying and that lying often occurs without self-deception. Third, he asserts that lying while retaining the truth is more adaptive than self-deception. For example, a person from a nomadic tribe lying about finding food benefits more from lying about it while retaining the truth than deceiving themselves and others that there is no food, even if lying might come with tell-tale signs of deceit, because otherwise they themselves would not be able to go back to the food. Finally, Van Leeuwen contends that it is most often the case that self-deceivers are the only ones that believe in their self-deceptions. For example, a driver who has a high appraisal of themselves but is really a poor driver is not going to fool someone who is their passenger and can readily assess the driver’s abilities themselves.
As to Trivers’ other hypotheses about the adaptive value of self-deception, Van Leeuwen questions how Trivers can account for multiple explanations of why self-deception is adaptive without asserting different evolved mechanisms for each hypothesis. That is, self-deception as a means to better other-deception and self-deception as a means of enhanced positive future orientation would require two different evolved behavioral modules, and cannot be accounted for by one overarching theory (Van Leeuwen, 2007).
Van Leeuwen (2007) asserts that self-deception often arises from general tendencies of wishful thinking, avoiding discomfort, the tendency not to questioning one’s current beliefs, and the awareness that beliefs can become self-fulfilling (and thus a refusal to accept negative beliefs, lest they become true). This is not an exhaustive list and does not necessarily clash with what Trivers asserts as secondary functions of self-deception. Regardless, while Van Leeuwen makes excellent points, Trivers’ hypotheses are currently favored by most psychologists doing research in the field of self-deception (Smith, 2004).