| Eulogy |
08-05-2010 12:36 PM |
Quote:
Because plaintiffs seek to exercise their fundamental
right to marry, their claim is subject to strict scrutiny.
Zablocki, 434 US at 388. That the majority of California voters
supported Proposition 8 is irrelevant, as “fundamental rights may
not be submitted to [a] vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections.” West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette, 319
US 624, 638 (1943). Under strict scrutiny, the state bears the
burden of producing evidence to show that Proposition 8 is narrowly
tailored to a compelling government interest. Carey v Population
Services International, 431 US 678, 686 (1977). Because the
government defendants declined to advance such arguments,
proponents seized the role of asserting the existence of a
compelling California interest in Proposition 8.
As explained in detail in the equal protection analysis,
Proposition 8 cannot withstand rational basis review. Still less
can Proposition 8 survive the strict scrutiny required by
plaintiffs’ due process claim. The minimal evidentiary
presentation made by proponents does not meet the heavy burden of
production necessary to show that Proposition 8 is narrowly
tailored to a compelling government interest. Proposition 8
cannot, therefore, withstand strict scrutiny. Moreover, proponents
do not assert that the availability of domestic partnerships
satisfies plaintiffs’ fundamental right to marry; proponents
stipulated that “[t]here is a significant symbolic disparity
between domestic partnership and marriage.” Doc #159-2 at 6.
Accordingly, Proposition 8 violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
[...]
SEXUAL ORIENTATION OR SEX DISCRIMINATION
Plaintiffs challenge Proposition 8 as violating the Equal
Protection Clause because Proposition 8 discriminates both on the
basis of sex and on the basis of sexual orientation. Sexual
orientation discrimination can take the form of sex discrimination.
Here, for example, Perry is prohibited from marrying Stier, a
woman, because Perry is a woman. If Perry were a man, Proposition
8 would not prohibit the marriage. Thus, Proposition 8 operates to
restrict Perry’s choice of marital partner because of her sex. But
Proposition 8 also operates to restrict Perry’s choice of marital
partner because of her sexual orientation; her desire to marry
another woman arises only because she is a lesbian.
The evidence at trial shows that gays and lesbians
experience discrimination based on unfounded stereotypes and
prejudices specific to sexual orientation. Gays and lesbians have
historically been targeted for discrimination because of their
sexual orientation; that discrimination continues to the present.
FF 74-76. As the case of Perry and the other plaintiffs
illustrates, sex and sexual orientation are necessarily
interrelated, as an individual’s choice of romantic or intimate
partner based on sex is a large part of what defines an
individual’s sexual orientation. See FF 42-43. Sexual orientation
discrimination is thus a phenomenon distinct from, but related to,
sex discrimination.
Proponents argue that Proposition 8 does not target gays
and lesbians because its language does not refer to them. In so
arguing, proponents seek to mask their own initiative. FF 57.
Those who choose to marry someone of the opposite sex ——
heterosexuals —— do not have their choice of marital partner
restricted by Proposition 8. Those who would choose to marry
someone of the same sex —— homosexuals —— have had their right to
marry eliminated by an amendment to the state constitution.
Homosexual conduct and identity together define what it means to be
gay or lesbian. See FF 42-43. Indeed, homosexual conduct and
attraction are constitutionally protected and integral parts of
what makes someone gay or lesbian. Lawrence, 539 US at 579; FF 42-
43; see also Christian Legal Society v Martinez, 561 US __, 130 SCt
2971, No 08-1371 Slip Op at 23 (“Our decisions have declined to
distinguish between status and conduct in [the context of sexual
orientation].”) (June 28, 2010) (citing Lawrence, 539 US at 583
(O’Connor, J, concurring)).
Proposition 8 targets gays and lesbians in a manner
specific to their sexual orientation and, because of their
relationship to one another, Proposition 8 targets them
specifically due to sex. Having considered the evidence, the
relationship between sex and sexual orientation and the fact that
Proposition 8 eliminates a right only a gay man or a lesbian would
exercise, the court determines that plaintiffs’ equal protection
claim is based on sexual orientation, but this claim is equivalent
to a claim of discrimination based on sex.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
As presently explained in detail, the Equal Protection
Clause renders Proposition 8 unconstitutional under any standard of
review. Accordingly, the court need not address the question
whether laws classifying on the basis of sexual orientation should
be subject to a heightened standard of review.
Although Proposition 8 fails to possess even a rational
basis, the evidence presented at trial shows that gays and lesbians
are the type of minority strict scrutiny was designed to protect.
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v Murgia, 427 US 307, 313 (1976)
(noting that strict scrutiny may be appropriate where a group has
experienced a “‘history of purposeful unequal treatment’ or been
subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped
characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities” (quoting
San Antonio School District v Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 28 (1973)). See
FF 42-43, 46-48, 74-78. Proponents admit that “same-sex sexual
orientation does not result in any impairment in judgment or
general social and vocational capabilities.” PX0707 at RFA No 21.
The court asked the parties to identify a difference
between heterosexuals and homosexuals that the government might
fairly need to take into account when crafting legislation. Doc
#677 at 8. Proponents pointed only to a difference between samesex
couples (who are incapable through sexual intercourse of
producing offspring biologically related to both parties) and
opposite-sex couples (some of whom are capable through sexual
intercourse of producing such offspring). Doc #687 at 32-34.
Proponents did not, however, advance any reason why the government
may use sexual orientation as a proxy for fertility or why the
government may need to take into account fertility when
legislating. Consider, by contrast, City of Cleburne v Cleburne
Living Center, 473 US 432, 444 (1985) (Legislation singling out a
class for differential treatment hinges upon a demonstration of
“real and undeniable differences” between the class and others);
see also United States v Virginia, 518 US 515, 533 (1996)
(“Physical differences between men and women * * * are enduring.”).
No evidence at trial illuminated distinctions among lesbians, gay
men and heterosexuals amounting to “real and undeniable
differences” that the government might need to take into account in
legislating.
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